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1. INTRODUCTION
Should politicians keep their promises? Should Europe’s airspace be safe? Some
questions obviously need the answer ‘Yes’. But are turning promises into reality and
ensuring that systems are demonstrably safe feasible tasks? The focus here is on the
problems of European Air Traffic Management (ATM) incident reporting. This is
certainly not a new concern: European ATM incident reporting is known to be patchy
(SRC [Eurocontrol Safety Regulation Commission], 2005a). How are the problems to
be solved: Institutional changes? More clarity about SRC documents such as ESARR 2
and ESARR 4? Better understanding of accident/incident causation? Simpler
approaches? Increased vigour by ATM safety managers and regulators?
The European Union (EU) legislation setting up the Single European Sky (EC, 2002)
states:
“Smooth operation of the air transport system requires a consistent, high level of
safety in air navigation services allowing optimum use of Europe's airspace and
a consistent, high level of safety in air travel…”
A Eurocontrol initiative, the European Safety Plan (ESP) (Eurocontrol, 2006), aims:
“to improve European Air Traffic Management (EATM) safety maturity across
the (42) European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) States to a common
minimum level by December 2008.”
The focus here is on mid-air collisions for aircraft under air traffic control (ATC), but
recognising that (eg) accidents on runways and taxiways can be equally catastrophic.
How can Europe know if safety levels are consistently high in all its States? Levels of
safety are very high, so there are very few accidents, certainly not on a State basis, to
make such an assessment. Hence, data from ATM safety incidents have to be used.
What is an incident – or a severe incident? Traditionally, severity is defined in terms of
the degree of risk associated with an observed event – but this just replaces one
abstraction by another; or through assessments by an expert group – so how is
consistency assured between States and over time?
22. ATM INCIDENT AND COLLISION MODEL
Figure 1 shows a basic ATM Incident and Collision Model equation. The Figure also
lists some of the problems encountered in trying to use it practically. If the parameters
in the equation are known, then it is possible to compare the estimated collision risk,
and hence safety, across States. The equation is necessarily true, simply because the
definitions interlock, but every term in the equation has definitional/computational
problems, as shown by the examples in the Figure. How could a different formulation
of this equation eliminate such problems – they are intrinsic to trying to do the
calculation of CE.
Safety targets place a maximum value on CE across all States (eg see SRC 2000,
2001, 2005a). CE is not directly measurable – ATM is extremely safe. FES, the scaling
Factor of Collisions to {Severity ~ S} incidents for State E, is extremely difficult to
estimate for general ATC situations, as distinct from special subsystems. The
temptation is to assume that it is about the same value across States, but this would
be no more than an ansatz.
Some specific value of the severity S is needed. Without a bottom limit, then, in
theory, all incidents could be reported, even those with minuscule safety impact,
which would probably tend to lead to massive under-reporting. Eurocontrol material
recognises problems with severity assessment, even when examined by genuinely
expert groups, eg SRC (2005c). Thus, de Jong and van Es (2006) comment.
“…it is obvious that a uniformly applied severity classification for air traffic
occurrences in Europe appears unfeasible. There are too many different views,
ideas and desires to make this possible…Although the ODA working group will
propose classifications, it is concluded that it is questionable whether these are
going to work…Hence, it appears there are serious problems with classifying the
severity of incidents:
 Incidents are not always reliably reported, let alone sufficiently
investigated. Severity is therefore often not classified; and
 There is no consistency in using one severity classification scheme.”
A critical problem is with the parameter RES. European ATM Incident reporting is
already the subject of high-level remedial action (Eurocontrol, 2006). PRC (2006)
notes:
“Based on limited information available …, reporting of incidents on “airspace
events” can be considered as mature in 15 States (representing 71 % of traffic),
low in 6 States, while 13 States report irregularly or have never reported since
2001. …Communication of information… is currently restricted by the
Publication and Confidentiality Policy
The PRC is presently not able to access safety information from individual
States. While there is a need to protect an individual’s identity in reporting
safety events, there is a priori no reason why States’ compliance with safety
regulations and incident reporting requirements should remain confidential.
Achieved levels of safety and their trends remain opaque.”
3Madsen (2002), GAIN Working Group E (2004) and Eurocontrol SAFREP (2005) are
important background documents in understanding the legal and safety culture issues
that underlie these problems. In particular, SRC’s document on incident reporting,
ESARR 2 (SRC, 2000), has turned out to be largely unworkable. To quote Eurocontrol
SAFREP (2005), the issues include:
 “As the scope of ESARR 2 is applicable to the State, it therefore implies co-
ordination between all Stakeholders involved in order to clarify the national
implementation of ESARR 2;
 The new terminology implied by ESARR 2;
 The level of detail, in terms of reporting of precursors to accidents/incidents
and the identification of causes;
 The severity and risk schemes which require further guidance to support a
harmonised implementation across States;
 The existence of two EU Directives in the same area as ESARR 2;
 The lack of safety regulatory expert resources (human and financial) at
national level; and
 The implementation of a ‘non-punitive environment’, with potential changes to
legislation other than aviation-related.”
It is in fact possible to use published Eurocontrol data to reveal how serious the
reporting problems are. Dean and Baldwin (2005) analyses ACAS (Airborne Collision
Avoidance System) related events on a European basis. Table 1 combines its data
with activity data from another Eurocontrol source, to produce a ratio R of incidents
reported to hours flown. The final column compares the R-value with that of Belgium,
which had the highest R-value.
Table 1 is not perfect: some incidents are of low severity (eg where ACAS is merely
alerting the pilot to keep to the present flightpath); some incidents occur outside
controlled airspace; the State or ATC service provider may filter out non-significant
incidents. But some crude messages are there: about half the States [NB: some States
joined Eurocontrol recently] did not participate in this important work; of those that
participated, about half had reporting rates at least a factor 10 down on the highest
reporting state – are some of these States are a factor ten safer?
Eurocontrol’s data in Table 1 is consistent with the PRC’s figures. Eurocontrol has
been monitoring ACAS ATC reports since 1991. 2003 was the year after the
Überlingen mid-air collision. Would the average air traveller be surprised by these
reporting statistics? Later paragraphs explore the potential vale of ACAS data.
43. SKETCH OF THE ATC SYSTEM DEFENCES
Incident Reporting needs to tell us about the ATC system’s functioning, so the starting
point must be how the system delivers safety. Figure 2 is a simplified version of the
highly structured control processes and defences ensuring safety, in reality there is a
very complex set of probabilistic feedbacks and interactions [compare the sequence of
errors and failures in the Überlingen accident (Nunes and Laursen, 2004)].
Explanations of separation minimum, STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert) and ACAS can
be found in Brooker (2005a) and its references; the symbols and are covered later.]
The existence of STCA – plus help from colleagues – means that the controller is
warned about potential separation breaches, even if he or she does not notice them.
Note that a separation breach can occur because the pilot deviates from the safe plan;
or when the safe plan was not in fact safe, in terms of the required minimum
separation between aircraft.
ATC system defences allow for error detection and corrections to be carried out
before any separation is breached, ie such errors would not be detected just from
records of separation breaches alone. Remedial action in the ATM system is
therefore diverse and in depth (eg Brooker (2005b).
4. INCIDENT REPORTING METHODS
Incident reports can be classified into three types:
Individual reporting means an operational person detects something that is
unsatisfactory in safety terms and reports this to a central monitoring body.
The likelihood of someone reporting an incident very much reflects the ATC
provider’s organisational safety culture (eg Fassert, 2001).
Event-related reporting is triggered by automatic system warnings or alerts.
The main examples are STCA and ACAS, with other systems being used in
different phases of flight, eg GPWS.
In Post-processed reporting, radar and related data is examined some time
after actual operations, to determine if (eg) separation minima have been
significantly breached (eg Separation Monitoring Function (SMF) in the UK).
A reasonable ATM indicator must indicate something about ATM safety or of the
performance of the ATM system’s safety defences. For a collision to occur:
Must have had separation breach – the aircraft was not flying to a safe plan or
the plan was not in fact safe.
Must have had failed or non-existent intervention(s) to remedy, even with
assistance from colleagues and warning systems.
Must have had the ‘right’ (post any intervention) flightpaths – traffic density,
route/airspace construction are factors.
5There are two obvious places for safety defence indicators in Figure 2, indicated by the
symbols and . The first counts initiating events that produce a separation breach, and
the second covers situations where the ground-based part of the system, ie ATC, has
not resolved an incident. The first indicator, at about in Figure 2, counts ‘Actual
Separation Breaches’ – ASB. The second indicator, at about in Figure 2 counts
‘Incident Not Resolved by ATC’ (INRA). Remembering an earlier issue, a key point in
favour of INRA is that it represents a definite ‘severity’ benchmark, because focuses
on incidents in which the ground ATC defences have been ‘used up’.
These two indicators represent decisive points in the safety defences, are very
simple to understand, and can be measured reasonably consistently. This is because
they correspond to measurable events or system states, rather than complex
judgemental assessments of what might have taken place, ie judgements about
severity. To find another simple indicator of specific severity in the flow chart between
and is extremely difficult, given the variability and complexity of what can happen
when ATC’s defensive mechanisms restore full system control. PRC (2006) generally
supports the use of using indicators such as ASB and INRA:
“Automated incident detection and analysis provides a wealth of complementary
information, as shown by positive experience in some States. This should be
introduced in every State as soon as possible.”
ASB and INRA need definitions that cover both typical and ‘pathological’ cases’, eg:
ASB This counts post-processed incidents that breached the appropriate
separation minimum. It excludes incidents for which the breach was ‘small’, eg a
2.5 Nm horizontal closest approach when the minimum is 3 Nm. It might also
exclude situations which ATC management declare ‘acceptable safe’, eg an
operating procedure that breaches a minimum slightly, to cope with tight
airspace constraints in the terminal area. But these exceptions must have been
documented in the ATC unit safety case or similar document.
INRA A count of Individual and/or Event-related reports in which the ground-
based part of the system, ie ATC, has not resolved an incident. Was an ACAS
Resolution Advisory (RA) then necessary to resolve safely? The simplest
incidents to count in this category are those in which an ACAS RA is deemed by
ATC to be ‘justified’. [If the incident were so very short-term that an RA was not
generated, eg a rapid descent to a small closest point of approach, then that
obviously would have to be included under this heading.]
Thus, the second indicator does require an assessment to be made by expert
controllers. But it is an assessment that is restricted to the kinds of things that
controllers actually experience, rather than an extrapolation beyond that. To resolve
the issues about safety culture in States, a specialist European body could be set up –
based on successful State-based ‘peer review’ models for incident assessment.
ASBs provide an indication if the rate of ‘initiating events’ is changing. ASBs are
used by the SRC (2005b) (although it is not obvious from the text if some
‘acceptable’ varieties of separation infringement are filtered from the counting).
6The ratio of the counts INRA to ASB is a measure of the effectiveness of the ground
ATC system in resolving initiating events. An improvement in this ratio would therefore
demonstrate an improvement in ground-based ATC.
There are good grounds for believing that INRA would be a good indicator of the
underlying collision rate, because the INRA would be scaled down by the proportion
of ACAS RAs that did not successfully resolve the situation. In other words, that
scaling-down would not be strongly dependent on the nature of the State’s ground
ATC operation and airspace structures. Hence, the value of FE S in Figure 1 would not
be strongly dependent on which State E was under consideration.
Brooker (2007) examines ATM incident reporting in more depth.
5. CONCLUSION
There has been failure over several years to produce an effective European ATM
reporting system or to define what 'serious' incidents are. It is therefore important not to
be too sophisticated and ambitious. Many of the current ESP tasks (under ‘High Priority
Activity Field 2: Incident Reporting and Data Sharing’ – Eurocontrol (2006), pages 16-
19) do appear ambitious, given the lack of significant past progress in implementing
SRC documents such as ESARR 2 and ESARR 4 – “This activity field will carry over
the area of the SSAP that has made least progress so far”.
As a start – rather than trying to resolve all the complex safety culture and severity
classification issues across States – incidents should be collected Europe-wide using
mainly automated means; and hence use SMF/STCA/ACAS data about tangible events
and/or recognisable system changes, rather than judgements about 'degree of risk'.
This will generate usable benchmarks, good – not perfect – descriptions of ATM safety.
Thus, the implication is that Europe should consider funding projects to enable SMF-
type systems and Mode S downlinking of data.
Voltaire said “Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien” – “The best is the enemy of the good”,
implying that a good or very good plan is actually better than a perfect plan. Hence,
identify good, simple indicators, based on significant kinds of events or states of system
control, and work to ensure that automatic systems are in place and reporting rates are
high.
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9State FH - controlled
flight Hours (000)
A - ACAS
ATC Reports
Ratio R
= A / FH
Ratio to
Belgium
Belgium 108 42 0.3889 1.000
UK 1225 342 0.2792 0.718
Switzerland 303 61 0.2013 0.518
Germany 1181 177 0.1499 0.385
Sweden 383 37 0.0966 0.248
Netherlands 146 9 0.0616 0.159
Hungary 149 6 0.0403 0.104
Estonia 32 1 0.0313 0.080
France 1999 21 0.0105 0.027
Ireland 197 2 0.0102 0.026
Czech Republic 152 1 0.0066 0.017
Ukraine 182 1 0.0055 0.014
Denmark 193 1 0.0052 0.013
Austria 220 1 0.0045 0.012
Norway 271 1 0.0037 0.009
Spain 1131 - - -
Italy 1033 - - -
Greece 408 - - -
Turkey 389 - - -
Portugal 222 - - -
Romania 206 - - -
Bulgaria 114 - - -
Finland 109 - - -
Croatia 99 - - -
Cyprus 91 - - -
Slovakia 54 - - -
Latvia 35 - - -
Malta 32 - - -
Slovenia 24 - - -
Lithuania 23 - - -
Albania 21 - - -
FYR Macedonia 18 - - -
Moldavia 5 - - -
Table 1. ACAS ATC Reports and Hours Flown, by State (2003 figures)
Notes:
Hours data from PRC (2005) [page 92]
ACAS ATC Reports data from Dean and Baldwin (2005) [page 10]
Italic font means State joined on or after 1/1/2001 – from Eurocontrol website
Armenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Poland, Serbia & Montenegro did not supply Hours data
The ACAS ATC Report for Czechoslovakia is arbitrarily assigned to the Czech Republic
The final column is the ratio of row R-values to that of Belgium
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NES x FES
CE =
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Figure 1. ATM Incident and Collision Model, plus a selection of issues
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Separation
responsibility
passed to pilot
Figure 2. Simplified controller and pilot processes to prevent mid-air collisions
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